Connecting Theory and Reality:
Teaching Gideon and Indigent Defendants’
Non-Right to Counsel at Bail
Douglas L. Colbert∗
I have a confession. I love teaching Gideon v. Wainwright.1 After all, when
you think of Supreme Court rulings that represent the highest ideals of our legal
system’s commitment to equal justice and to fairness, you must seriously consider
placing Gideon’s right to counsel on your short list of top ten (or five or three) alltime most important judicial decisions. I know I am not alone. Cases like Gideon
are highlighted in virtually every criminal procedure casebook in the chapter
devoted to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. It is easy to understand why. In
Gideon, we get to teach a stirring story about justice triumphing, an account of the
“little guy’s” fight against all odds to obtain a court appointed lawyer who then
succeeds in gaining an acquittal and protecting his freedom and dignity rights.
Gideon is the legal victory that makes Hollywood producers drool about the
prospect of an award-winning movie2 and allows book authors to dream of a
Pulitzer Prize.3
Within the classroom, Gideon allows us to teach, and our students to
experience, the justice system at its best. We provide hope that, with capable
counsel, the disenfranchised and powerless can successfully defend against felony
charges prosecuted by the all-powerful State. For those of you still unsure about
whether there is room in your crowded syllabus to give Gideon a prominent place,
take another look at the eleven-page opinion. I promise it won’t take you long to
read. I almost guarantee you will find the language refreshing and invigorating,
particularly in these times of “peril,”4 when a suspected terrorist may be
incarcerated indefinitely and denied counsel and access to court.5
∗
The author was a panel speaker for The Promise of Gideon: Unfulfilled?, which was the
Section on Criminal Justice program at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools on January 5, 2006. This commentary is a product of the author’s presentation at that
program. The author gives special thanks to his clinic law students who continue to inspire efforts to
make representation at bail a reality for indigent defendants.
1
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2
Actor Henry Fonda brought the picture of Clarence Earl Gideon to life for many Americans
in his starring role in Gideon’s Trumpet. See GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Worldvision HV Inc. 1980).
3
Two-time Pulitzer Prize author Anthony Lewis told the story of one man’s struggle to make
the constitutional right to counsel a reality for every person accused of a felony crime. ANTHONY
LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964).
4
During periods of constitutional crisis, courts have retreated from protecting individuals’
human and freedom rights. In 1852, as pro- and anti-slavery forces vied for supremacy, Missouri’s
high state court cited the perilous times that led to overruling a decision that had favored the Dred
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Criminal procedure casebook authors showcase Gideon and usually include a
second Supreme Court decision decided nine years later, Argersinger v. Hamlin,6
an attractive and logical choice for continuing the teaching of the Sixth
Amendment. Describing the “assembly line justice”7 system in states’ lower
criminal courts, Argersinger extended Gideon’s constitutional guarantee to
counsel’s representation in petty misdemeanor offenses where a defendant receives
a jail sentence. Referring to the “scant regard” these overworked misdemeanor
courts are able to devote to most defendants’ cases, the Justices observed that “the
gap between the theory [of individualized justice] and the reality is enormous.”8 In
these lower courts, people are given “[i]nadequate attention” and are seen as
“numbers on dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on their way.”9
Defense counsel is necessary, concluded the Court, to protect an accused’s pretrial
and trial rights.
Here again law professors may find that including Argersinger in the assigned
material for class discussion aids students’ understanding of the high volume,
misdemeanor criminal justice system, while also promoting a positive image for
how the judiciary responded to the right to counsel deficiency in states’ indigent
defense systems. Concurring Chief Justice Warren Burger, for instance, appealed
to lawyers’ high ideals and interest in promoting access to justice when he referred
to the American Bar Association’s sweeping recommendation that counsel should
be appointed “in all criminal proceedings for offenses punishable by loss of

Scott family’s suit for freedom. “Times now are not as they were when the former decisions
[granting emancipation] . . . were made. Since then not only individuals but States have been
possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery . . . whose inevitable consequences must be
the overthrow and destruction of our government.” Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 586 (1852).
Rejecting Dred Scott’s federal claim, the United States Supreme Court referred to slavery’s
“controversies . . . [that] have occasioned most peril to the peace of the Union.…” Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. 393, 516 (1856).
5
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that indefinite detention and denial
of access to counsel and to judicial tribunal of U.S. citizen captured on foreign soil and deemed an
enemy combatant is not unconstitutional per se). But cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006)
(holding that a defendant is entitled to federal habeas corpus hearing to challenge denial of due
process guarantees provided by military and international law).
6
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
7
Id. at 36. (where the Supreme Court referred to “the prejudice which results to
misdemeanor defendants from this ‘assembly-line justice.’”) The Court described the “picture” of
the usual misdemeanor trial that “is characterized by insufficient and frequently irresponsible
preparation on the part of the defense, the prosecution, and the court. Everything is rush, rush.” Id.
at 35 (citing William E. Hellerstein, The Importance of the Misdemeanor Case on Trial and Appeal,
28 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 151, 152 (1970)). See infra notes 11–13.
8
Id. at 35 (citing Dean Edward Barrett and a report by the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice).
9
Id.
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liberty.”10 Acknowledging that counsel’s presence at every stage “may well add
large new burdens on a profession already overtaxed,” the Chief Justice
optimistically predicted the “dynamics of the profession” would meet the
challenge.11
Has the profession responded adequately to Chief Justice Burger’s challenge
since Argersinger was decided? Should indigent defendants, who comprise most
of the people prosecuted in state court, now expect a lawyer’s advocacy “at all
criminal proceedings,” beginning with the initial bail or pretrial release
appearance? Or is the reality of Argersinger’s right to counsel applicable to
representation at a considerably later stage in state misdemeanor proceedings, such
as when an incarcerated defendant is considering whether to accept a plea, or at
trial itself?12 And what has happened to “assembly line justice” in our nation’s
lower criminal courts?”
Criminal procedure textbooks13 shed minimal light on these important
questions. More than thirty five years after Gideon and Argersinger brought the
public spotlight on states’ failure to guarantee counsel at trial, it is the rare text that
tells about the national saga in which most indigent defendants trek through state

10
Id. at 43 (emphasis added) (where the ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice
concluded that “[c]ounsel should be provided in all criminal proceedings for offenses punishable by
loss of liberty, except those types of offenses for which such punishment is not likely to be imposed,
regardless of their denomination as felonies, misdemeanors or otherwise.”)
11
Id. at 44.
12
In Argersinger, the Supreme Court focused on “the guilty plea, a problem which looms
large in misdemeanor as well as in felony cases.” 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972). The Court described
counsel’s critical role in counseling indigents whether to go to trial or negotiate a guilty plea so that
the defendant “may know precisely what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of
going to jail or prison.…” Id.
13
For this article, I wanted to focus on the most frequently assigned casebooks, but publishers
were reluctant to reveal the “best-sellers.” Consequently, I reviewed fourteen casebooks and one
hornbook that I received from publishing companies: RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 2005); NEIL P. COHEN & DONALD J. HALL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE
POST-INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS, CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2000); JOSEPH G. COOK & PAUL
MARCUS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (6th ed. 2005); JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES (2d ed. 2003); PHILIP E. JOHNSON &
MORGAN CLOUD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FROM INVESTIGATION TO TRIAL (4th ed.
2005); YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS
(11th ed. 2005); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2004) (hornbook);
ARNOLD H. LOEWY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS AND QUESTIONS (2d ed. 2006);
ARTHUR R. MILLER & CHARLES A. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES AND
EXECUTIVE MATERIALS (2d ed. 2003); MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES AND PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: THE COURTROOM (4th ed. 2004); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY (7th ed. 2004); ANDREW E. TASLITZ &
MARGARET L. PARIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 2003); RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET
AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES (2d ed. 2004); LLOYD L. WEINREB,
CASES, COMMENT, QUESTIONS (7th ed. 2004); and CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS (4th ed. 2000).
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court pretrial systems where they must defend themselves at the bail stage14 and
where they often do not meet their assigned counsel until the next court
appearance.15 While some texts distinguish themselves for suggesting to law
students that today’s indigent defendants may be without counsel at bail hearings,16
none examine whether Argersinger’s description of “assembly-line justice” still
holds true in the lower criminal courts.17 This oversight obfuscates the crucial
importance of a defender at the beginning stages of a criminal prosecution when
counsel’s presence is “most critical”18 for protecting individual liberty, conducting
14
The following examples illustrate casebook authors’ tendency to avoid mention that
Gideon’s guarantee of counsel does not translate to a lawyer’s advocacy at indigent defendants’
initial appearance or bail hearing: DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 13; JOHNSON & CLOUD, supra
note 13; LOEWY, supra note 13; MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 13; MOSKOVITZ, supra note 13;
SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 13; WEAVER ET AL., supra note 13; TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note
13; and WEINREB, supra note 13.
15
Only eight states uniformly provide a lawyer to an indigent defendant at the initial
appearance and bail stage. Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to
Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8–10 [hereinafter Colbert, Thirty-Five Years].
In eighteen states, a poor person is systematically denied counsel statewide; twenty-four states ensure
counsel only in one or two jurisdictions. Counsel’s delay may range from days to weeks to as long as
two to four months. Id. at 10–11. See also Douglas C. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter?
The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. Rev. 1719, 1727
(2002).
16
Only one text directly indicates that an accused is not assigned counsel at a bail proceeding.
See COHEN & HALL, supra note 13, at 92 (“In many cases, the defendant is not represented by
counsel at the bail hearing.”). Several authors make a strong argument in favor of considering bail a
“critical stage,” that requires states to provide representation. See infra note 31; WHITEBREAD &
SLOBOGIN, supra note 13, at 906–11 (where the authors conclude that “given the fact that the bail
hearing involves both the prosecutor and the defendant, as well as cross-examination of prosecution
witnesses, it is likely to be considered a “critical stage.”) Id. at 910; LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, at
650 (“Because counsel for the defendant can make such an impact at the bail hearing, there is much
to be said for the contention that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies at that time.”); COOK
& MARCUS, supra note 13, at 593. Some authors ask students to consider whether bail is a critical
stage and provide empirical data to support the argument that representation significantly affects the
outcome. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 1118 n.4. Others raise the issue for students’
consideration. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 13 at 957.
17
Some texts do not include Argersinger, either as an excerpted court opinion or for extensive
discussion in the notes section. See, e.g., COHEN & HALL, supra note 13; LOEWY, supra note 13;
MOSKOVITZ, supra note 13; TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 13; JOHNSON & CLOUD, supra note 13;
WEINREB, supra note 13. Of the authors who devoted space for Argersinger in their casebook, each
chose to omit the Supreme Court’s designation and extensive description of “assembly line justice” in
lower state courts where most defendants are prosecuted and where virtually everyone appears.
Eliminating the “assembly line justice” language deprives students of exploring how a justice system
functions without lawyers, and of appreciating assigned counsel’s limited role and often belated
appearance at criminal proceedings. See supra notes 6–12 and accompanying text.
18
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (holding that a capital defendant’s due process
right to counsel commences at “the most critical period of the proceedings . . . from the time of . . .
arraignment until the beginning of . . . trial, when consultation, thorough-going investigation and
preparation [are] vitally important”).
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a “thorough-going investigation,”19 preparing a defense, evaluating the
government’s case and otherwise ensuring an accused’s right to a fair trial. As
discussed below, a lawyer’s representation at bail is also essential to shield the
unrepresented defendant from speaking and making inculpatory statements that
may “reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.”20 Yet textbook authors, and
presumably most classroom professors, say very little about the invisibility of
defense lawyers when accused indigents first appear in court.
Consequently, when judged against the material they read in the assigned
textbook, I am not surprised when upper-level students declare that, after studying
criminal procedure, they had a strong impression that all is well in the pretrial
system: following arrest, they believe that poor people are represented by a lawyer,
that counsel is present to protect individual liberty before trial, and that the judicial
system stands ready to correct a glaring gap in representation. Few are told that
Chief Justice Burger’s optimism in 1972 has neither been matched by state
legislatures’ generosity in funding appointed counsel nor by state bar associations’
call for enhanced representation to indigent defendants. It is only when my
students observed actual court proceedings that they became aware of how many
defendants did not have a lawyer at a bail hearing and how many met counsel for
the first time on the next court date when a misdemeanor trial or felony
preliminary hearing would be scheduled.
In brief, while most criminal procedure textbooks dutifully report about the
evolution of the right to counsel, they do not elaborate on Gideon’s irrelevance at
the bail stage. Nor do they speak to Argersinger’s reality in the often chaotic
conditions prevailing in states’ lower criminal courts. Do criminal procedure
textbook authors lose interest in the importance and real meaning of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel for the people entering the criminal justice system?
Or do they just assume Gideon’s promise has been fulfilled? Is this approach
indicative of a greater divide between those who teach from those who practice, or
from those more familiar with prosecution than criminal defense? Or is the limited
Sixth Amendment textbook treatment reflective only of the tough choices an
author must make when reviewing reported decisions and choosing material for
inclusion?
Whatever the reason, ask a student or practicing lawyer today whether an
accused’s constitutional right to counsel commences at the bail stage and continues
thereafter, and, I predict, most will reply affirmatively. Is this a result of watching
too many episodes of Law and Order and seeing the accused represented by
counsel at New York City bail hearings and thereafter? Perhaps, but I think the
problem is more serious. I believe we are missing an important opportunity to tell
the full and honest story in our criminal procedure classes about the reality of
19

Id.
Gouveia v. United States, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 224 (1967)).
20
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counsel’s limited guarantee in states’ pretrial justice systems. Without exposing
students to this information, professors relieve students from the responsibility of
wrestling with the apparent inconsistency between indigent defendants’ entitlement
to counsel at or near trial and lack of accessibility to the constitutional right when
personal liberty is immediately at stake and when there is an immediate need to
interview witnesses and commence a defense.
In this essay, I provide ample justification for expanding classroom discussion
of Gideon and Argersinger to illustrate why these Supreme Court rulings have
failed to guarantee representation at bail proceedings and during the investigation
period leading to the next scheduled court proceeding. Indeed, I welcomed the
invitation to speak and to publish this piece as an opportunity to place an academic
spotlight on this long-overlooked problem of denying counsel to indigent
defendants. I hope my article encourages authors who publish casebooks, and
professors who teach Criminal Procedure courses, to revisit their teaching material
and update students about Gideon’s and Argersinger’s realities in local and state
courts. For reform to succeed and for the guarantee of counsel to be meaningful to
indigent defendants at the front end of the system, I am convinced the academy
must do more to provide awareness and appreciation of the unrepresented
defendant at bail.
I. TEACHING GIDEON AND ARGERSINGER
Back in the early 1960s when Clarence Earl Gideon was denied a lawyer at
his burglary trial, it was not because he fit the profile of a suspected terrorist. The
State of Florida was merely following a time-honored tradition. Since the
founding of our nation nearly 175 years earlier, states have had no legal duty to
assign counsel to a poor person charged with committing a felony crime.21 Judges
had grown accustomed to conducting trials without defense lawyers and seeing
accused felons like Gideon stand alone and go through the motions of pretending
they were capable of defending themselves against a legally trained and
experienced prosecutor. Most everyone knew an uneducated poor person’s selfrepresentation had little chance of success, but they chose to remain silent and to
maintain the “emperor has no clothes” illusion that justice without counsel was
possible.
Appearing before a Florida trial court on a charge of breaking and entering a
pool hall and stealing from a cigarette machine, Gideon was typical of many
defendants; arrested frequently for non-violent crimes, Gideon had little formal
education, supported himself with odd jobs, gambled, drank and often found

21

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Supreme Court provided a historical
overview of the limited meaning of the right to counsel during colonial and post-revolutionary
America; see also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461–65 (1942) .
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himself without money.22 Thus, Gideon remained incarcerated while awaiting trial
because he could not afford bail.23 Aware of his limited capability to defend
himself, Gideon probably surprised the trial judge when he asked for a courtappointed lawyer. “Mr. Gideon, I am sorry,” replied the judge, “but I cannot
appoint counsel to represent you in this case [u]nder the laws of the State of
Florida.”24 The trial judge’s ruling was legally sound: in 1942 the Supreme Court
had rejected a similar challenge by a Maryland defendant and approved the “usual
practice” of denying a trial lawyer to an accused facing a felony charge.25
Law professors may find the greatest pleasure in teaching the Gideon story by
simply referring to the opinion’s clear and straightforward language. Speaking for
a unanimous Court, Justice Black exposed and rejected the legal fiction of an
indigent defendant’s ability to self-defend. Declaring that Gideon had done “about
as well as could be expected from a layman,”26 Justice Black reminded the nation
and legal profession that the justice system’s commitment to fairness and
impartiality depended on trial counsel’s presence. “[E]very defendant stands equal
before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”27 Incorporating a
due process right to counsel analysis that the Court had applied three decades
earlier to reverse death sentences against eight defendants in Powell v. Alabama,28
the infamous Scottsboro trial, the Gideon Court explained that “even the intelligent
and educated layman . . . is incapable . . . [and] lacks the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense . . . [without] the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him.”29 Prosecuting Gideon on felony
22
Anthony Lewis described Gideon “as a fifty-one year old white man who had been in and
out of prisons much of his life . . . [but] [h]e had never been a professional criminal or man of
violence.” LEWIS, supra note 3, at 5. Growing up during the depression, Gideon had an eighth grade
education, had difficulty holding onto a steady job and often relied on public assistance. Id. at 66–69,
72–74.
23
Today nearly 475,000 incarcerated detainees await trial in state criminal court. Most
remain in jail because they cannot post bail. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2005 (2006)
(indicating that 62% of the 747,000 people incarcerated in local jails are awaiting trial). See
International Center for Prison Studies website, available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/.
24
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1964).
25
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. at 472 (rejecting a Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to
counsel in felony cases); see also Douglas Colbert, Coming Soon to a Court Near You—Convicting
the Unrepresented at the Bail Stage: An Autopsy of a State High Court’s Sua Sponte Rejection of
Indigent Defendants’ Right to Counsel, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 653, 705–06 (2006) [hereinafter
Colbert, Coming Soon to a Court].
26
372 U.S. at 337.
27
Id. at 344.
28
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
29
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (citing Justice Sutherland’s majority ruling in Powell, 287 U.S. at
68–69).
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charges without providing counsel violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, declared the Court.
More recently, the Gideon focus has shifted from the threshold issue of
whether an accused is entitled to a defender to whether a defendant’s right to
“effective assistance”30 can be reconciled with assigned counsel’s high caseload,
limited resources and lack of preparedness. Viewed from this perspective, Gideon
may seem neither spectacular nor remarkable. But no one should underestimate
what an exceptional case Gideon makes for classroom teaching nor minimize its
significance and potential application for applying a similar approach to remedy
today’s problem of lawyers’ absence from bail proceedings. At the time when
Gideon was decided, the Supreme Court did the unthinkable. It mandated states to
develop an indigent defense system that had not existed previously, one that would
guarantee legal representation to indigent defendants in felony cases and
subsequently, in misdemeanors and at critical pretrial stages,31 too. Henceforth,
said Justice Black, “[a]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer”
must be guaranteed trial counsel to “be assured a fair trial.”32 Fairness, said the
unanimous Court, was the touchstone for considering “lawyers in criminal courts .
. . necessities, not luxuries.”33 Ensuring every accused had an advocate was
essential “to achieve a fair system of justice.”34 Justice Black answered those who
complained that the states’ expenses would be too great when he highlighted a
distinguishing feature of our legal system: “[t]he right of one charged with crime to

30

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (creating a constitutional standard to assess
whether an attorney provided effective representation). See, e.g., Kyong M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon
v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent Defendants and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L.
367, 373–79 (2004); Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Briefing Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1615, 1620 (2002); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The
Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 625 (1986); State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993) (holding the New Orleans public defender
system unconstitutional because of defenders’ unreasonably high caseloads).
31
The Gideon Supreme Court held that the right to counsel was “so fundamental and essential
to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that it is made obligatory [on] the States.” 372 U.S. at
340. Several years later in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967), the Supreme Court
defined a critical stage as a pretrial confrontation in which counsel’s presence was necessary to
protect a defendant from evidence that could “determine the accused’s fate” at trial. The Court’s
two-prong analysis required a showing that the pretrial confrontation posed a risk of “potential
substantial prejudice to [the] defendant’s rights,” and that counsel’s presence could “help avoid that
prejudice.” Id. at 227. Thereafter in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972), the Court modified
its Sixth Amendment analysis to require the “initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings,”
such as the filing of charges and a trial-like confrontation where the unrepresented accused “finds
himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of
substantive and procedural criminal law.”
32
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
33
Id.
34
Id.
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counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some
countries, but it is in ours.”35
Gideon tells a remarkable story about the lawyer’s role in advancing what was
presumably a hopeless cause: the then radical notion that states had a constitutional
obligation to ensure that every poor person received “the aid of counsel.”36 The
volunteer, pro bono efforts of private attorneys Abe Fortas and Abe Krash,
partners in one of Washington D.C.’s prestigious law firms, gave substance to
what Chief Justice Burger meant when he placed hope that the “dynamics of the
profession” would answer the judicial call to defend the unrepresented. Similar
actions and responses by leading members of the private bar may be the blueprint
now needed to move the profession to fulfill the commitment to Gideon’s first
principle of representation: once government initiates a criminal prosecution,
lawyers must be considered “necessities, not luxuries” at the bail stage in order to
“achieve a fair system of justice.”
II. ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN
Almost a decade later, Gideon’s accomplishment allowed the Supreme Court
to add Argersinger’s important chapter on “assembly line justice” in the lower
misdemeanor courts to the evolving right to counsel story. It was surely an
account worth telling thirty five years ago and today’s version is no less
compelling.
While generalities are always difficult, a walk inside a local courtroom today,
particularly in an urban or high volume court setting, reveals a system still
operating on Argersinger’s “rush, rush” and “let’s make a deal” principle. Perhaps
criminal courts do not operate quite as fast as the way the justice system functioned
back then, but the speed and depersonalization in which courts process people’s
cases is much closer to the assembly line than to the individualized model one
might have anticipated. Assigned defenders are few, and indigent defendants are
many. Defenders can be heard calling names of unknown and previously unseen,
soon-to-be clients. The more fortunate indigent defendant answers and listens to
the assigned defender’s usually well-meaning yet hasty conversation with the
puzzled look of a customer wondering whether to believe a sales person’s advice.
Defendants without a lawyer prepare to ask for postponement or to request
counsel. A lone prosecutor, or perhaps a second colleague also responsible for that
day’s docket, assumes a clerk-like role in recording the proceedings and sorting
defendants into common categories for possible dispositions. The prosecutor and
presiding judge work together and share an “almost total preoccupation . . . with
the movement of cases.”37 They find it efficient to group defendants, dismissing
35

Id.
Id. at 343. In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Supreme Court rejected virtually the
identical right to counsel argument.
37
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 34.
36
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some cases, taking a group plea for others on a minor nuisance charge, and
accepting community service in lieu of full prosecution.
I assign students to witness these courtroom proceedings and to submit a
reflection paper. Most find it an eye-opening experience. Invariably, students
comment upon the rapid pace in which the judge and prosecutor move a court
docket. It is so different from what they see on television and so much closer to
their reading of Argersinger’s description of the lower court’s operation. I also ask
students to observe bail hearings. They are startled to see individual detainees
speak for themselves and without a lawyer. Students wonder how a judge is able
to render a fair decision when the accused remains in jail and appears on a
television broadcast.38 Others report that accused defendants, overwhelmingly
African American, were transported to court but were brought before the judge in
chains and handcuffs.39 In class, students engage in lively discussion about their
courtroom observations. The hands-on experience provides the most useful
learning vehicle for teaching the importance of reading and carefully scrutinizing a
court opinion.
Had Gideon and Argersinger succeeded in providing indigent defendants with
access to counsel at their initial court appearance and during the pretrial stage,
criminal procedure authors would have succeeded in covering the baseline
material. As the next section explains, however, Gideon and Argersinger have not
significantly altered the picture one is accustomed to witnessing in state courts.
Many indigent defendants still stand alone and argue for pretrial release without
legal representation—a situation reminiscent of past days when counsel was
regarded as extraneous and non-essential to protecting an accused’s liberty at
judicial criminal proceedings.
III. RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT BAIL
As a law student, I studied Gideon and Argersinger. When I accepted my
first job as a criminal defense lawyer with the New York City Legal Aid Society, I
thanked my professors for preparing me to practice law and reminding me of the
lawyer’s potential for making a difference in people’s lives. In the classroom,
professors inspired students by bringing their attention to existing practices that
they thought were ripe for challenge. Some even argued cases themselves that
they thought would advance protection of constitutional rights for all. Many of my
38
See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing Technology: The
Remote Defendant, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1089, 1114–19 (2004) (discussing courts’ use of
videoconferencing technology to bring criminal defendants to court without carefully evaluating the
impact of that practice on the quality of justice).
39
When I first arrived in Baltimore in 1994, city defendants appeared chained and handcuffed
to one another; now they remain in jail and are among groups of twenty detainees who view court
proceedings from the “bail room.” Fifteen minutes away, Baltimore County detainees continue to
remain handcuffed and chained to one another when appearing without counsel at the bail review
hearing.
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Legal Aid colleagues shared this attitude of wanting to contribute toward making
equal justice a reality. As defenders of the poor, we found many opportunities to
test our legal theory of the meaning of effective representation from the moment
we began advocacy at our client’s initial appearance. Whatever else may be said
about New York City’s busy lower criminal court system, an accused could always
count on legal aid representation at a bail hearing.
Consequently, when I arrived in Maryland in 1994 after many years of city
practice, I assumed that poor people everywhere in the United States were
represented by counsel when they first appeared in court before a judicial officer. I
soon learned that my Saul Steinberg-like view of the country was dead wrong.40
When my students and I visited Baltimore city and other Maryland counties’ initial
Commissioner bail hearing that was conducted at a jail or police precinct, we never
saw a lawyer present to advocate for an accused’s release. Nor was a defender
usually there to represent indigent defendants at the subsequent bail review
hearing.41
I was determined to discover whether Maryland represented the norm or was
an aberration, so I began looking at other state systems. I mailed surveys to the
fifty states and to individual counties and defenders’ offices.42 Reviewing the
responses, I soon realized it was the rare state and locality that guaranteed counsel
uniformly within its borders. Like other well-kept secrets, indigent defendants
already knew the rule that the legal profession refused to acknowledge: do not
expect a lawyer present when first appearing before a judicial officer at a bail
hearing. Prepare to defend yourself.
As a courtroom observer, I found myself cringing at defendants’ attempt to
self-represent. Many would not have received Clarence Earl Gideon’s “passing”
grade after deciding to speak in an effort to gain pretrial release; they rarely
succeeded in reducing bail. Even more seriously, their effort to regain liberty
sometimes resulted in making an inculpatory statement that prosecutors could use
to secure a conviction.
IV. FENNER V. STATE43
The Maryland Court of Appeals’ recent ruling in Fenner v. State adds another
dimension to the significant consequences indigent defendants face when they are
40
Artist Saul Steinberg’s drawing View of the World from 9th Avenue shows a distorted view
in which New York City occupies most of the country.
41
In Maryland’s two-prong system, arrestees first appear before a District Court
commissioner who makes the initial pretrial release determination. MD. R. 4-213. At commissioner
hearings, indigent defendants are not represented by counsel. Thereafter, detainees who remain
incarcerated appear in court or at a televised video bail review hearing; in most counties, a defender
is not present.
42
Colbert, Thirty-Five Years, supra note 15, at 53–58.
43
846 A.2d 1020 (Md. 2004).
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denied counsel at the bail stage. Left alone to speak, the unrepresented indigent
defendant’s attempt to regain liberty may result in uttering a statement that a
prosecutor uses as evidence at trial.
In Fenner, the presiding bail review judge asked the unrepresented defendant,
“Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself, sir?”44 During his rambling
reply, Mr. Fenner attempted to convince the judge that the $150,000 bail
previously set was meant for a major drug dealer, not for a user like himself who
was charged with a fifty dollar transaction and who sold to support an addiction.
“I’m not denying what happened,” Fenner volunteered, prompting the judge to
interrupt and offer the belated advice that he needed to speak to a lawyer and
should say no more.45 Fenner’s words would prove extremely costly. They likely
were the decisive evidence that convinced a jury to convict and a judge to impose a
twenty-year jail sentence.46
The Maryland Court of Appeals ruling was the first time a state court of last
resort ruled that indigent defendants’ constitutional right to counsel does not
include representation at bail. Other states likely will face similar issues of
admissibility as prosecutors realize Fenner’s potential for gathering additional
evidence against an unrepresented accused. Based on the Maryland high court’s
ruling, an able prosecutor would be wise to examine the transcript of a bail
proceeding to determine whether the defendant’s self-representation resulted in
inculpatory or impeachment evidence. Prosecutors also may choose to actively
participate at bail proceedings. They may ask the presiding judge to make a
Fenner-inquiry to an unsuspecting and overmatched defendant, or in certain
situations, the prosecutor may decide to speak and provoke a response from an
unrepresented defendant. In sum, Fenner’s rejection of counsel’s mandatory
presence at bail provides the prosecution with the capability to transform the bail
hearing into an evidence gathering proceeding against accused indigent defendants.
Fenner should be included in criminal procedure textbooks. Faculty-led class
discussions will allow students and soon-to-be attorneys to appreciate the
similarities between Fenner and the pre-Gideon courtroom procedures and to
recognize the drastic consequences to unrepresented criminal defendants who
decide to speak at the bail hearing to gain a bail reduction or pretrial release.
As the following section reveals, most textbook authors have not yet
connected the absence of counsel at bail to the pre-Gideon or pre-Argersinger
centuries-old period. Nor have many highlighted that lawyers make a substantial

44
45

Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1023–24. The judge replied: “Sir, you need to have a lawyer just as soon as you can.”

Id.
46

Colbert, Coming Soon to a Court, supra note 25, at 653–54, 669–73 (arguing that aside
from the defendant’s statement, the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming).

2006]

CONNECTING THEORY AND REALITY

179

difference when advocating for pretrial release47 for the individual defendant
whose liberty before trial is at stake.
V. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASEBOOKS
Before reviewing colleagues’ treatment of the right to counsel at bail and
during pretrial proceedings in their criminal procedure casebooks, I must make
several admissions and disclaimers. First, I have never authored a law textbook of
any kind. I can only imagine the difficult editing choices that must be made.
Second, I have general admiration and respect for those who do publish. They
make it possible for us to succeed at teaching challenging course material. Third, I
am concentrating only on a single aspect of covered material, indigents’ right to
counsel, in an entire course. Every book I examined had many plusses in their
coverage of other important criminal procedure issues. Fourth, while I am very
choosy in assigning the “best” book for students, especially for a large class like
criminal procedure, I also recognize the imperfect selection process. Because of
my interest in authors’ treatment of indigents’ right to counsel, I proceeded by
closely examining their choice of reported cases and the selection of excerpted
language and reading material following a main case. Having entered the academy
after years of practice as a legal aid lawyer, I sought to measure the balance
between theory and reality in authors’ treatment of indigent defendants’ right to
counsel.
I reached several conclusions. First, most criminal procedure texts are heavily
weighted toward covering the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.48 When I ask law
students what they learned in the course, few mention that they studied the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in depth or at all. Judging from criminal procedure
47
It is the rare casebook that cites and explains the significant difference legal representation
meant for people accused of non-violent crimes. Only two texts cite an empirical study conducted in
Baltimore showing that judicial officers released represented defendants on recognizance 2.5 times
more frequently than similarly-situated defendants who had no lawyer. In addition, the study
revealed that judicial officers reduced bail to an affordable amount for a second group of represented
defendants 2.5 times as often as they did for a similarly-situated group of unrepresented defendants.
See COHEN & HALL, supra note 13, at 93; ALLEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 1118 n.4. Keeping in mind
that roughly nine out of ten people arrested are charged with non-violent misdemeanor offenses
prosecuted in states’ lower criminal courts, the Baltimore Lawyers at Bail strongly supports the
policy justifications for states’ investing in early representation.
48
Some authors clearly intended that their casebooks would focus on police practices and
selected search and seizure and confession case material that comprised the bulk of their texts. See,
e.g., COOK & MARCUS, supra note 13 (about 75% of text concentrated on the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments and significant attention was given to the right to counsel, too); JOHNSON & CLOUD,
supra note 13 (about 65%); LOEWY, supra note 13 (about 70%); TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 13
(about 85%). More typically, authors devoted a substantial portion of their texts—roughly one third
to one half—to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 13 (about
40%); SALTZBURG, supra note 13 (about 45%); MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 13 (about 40%);
MOSKOVITZ, supra note 13 (about 40%); WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 13 (43%); KAMISAR
ET AL., supra note 13 (30%); WEAVER ET AL., supra note 13 (about 33%).
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textbooks, this comes as no surprise. Most authors concentrate on including
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Supreme Court rulings that illustrate the evolving
balance between individual rights and law enforcement interests. Unquestionably
these discussions are fascinating and important for today’s students to understand
the judiciary’s usual deference to police action and issues related to racial profiling
and interrogation practices. Yet, considering how predictable the legal challenges
are to a police search or interrogation—judges invariably reject defendants’
suppression motions—authors should revisit the extensive coverage they afford
search and seizure and interrogation issues, particularly when these choices limit
students from appreciating the under-attended Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and the reality of indigent defendants’ self-representation
Second, most authors give little attention to indigent defendants’ right to
counsel. Though virtually every textbook includes an excerpted Gideon, the
common ground ends there. On one end of the spectrum, there are authors who do
a splendid job introducing students to the evolution of counsel from Powell to
Gideon and Argersinger,49 and who reference the continuing crisis in indigent
defense representation.50 At the other extreme are the more frequent casebooks
that swiftly conclude the right to counsel analysis with a cursory review of
Argersinger 51 and never consider whether assembly line justice is still the norm in
defenders’ practice in the lower criminal courts.52 Authors turn instead to other
Sixth Amendment issues, such as the distinction between an accused’s right to
counsel when sentenced to jail or to the growing case law interpreting the
“effective assistance” of counsel standard. Considering that indigent defendants
comprise 75–85% of criminal prosecutions, I found it perplexing that criminal
procedure texts failed to highlight the widespread denial of accused indigents’
most important right, the guarantee of a lawyer to defend and to advocate from the
moment adversarial proceedings commence.53 I thought about how professors
49

See, e.g., COOK & MARCUS, supra note 13, at 479–510 (extensive Betts-GideonArgersinger case analysis); DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 1–14 (commences casebook by
introducing students to Powell, Scottsboro and Gideon).
50
See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 163–67 nn.5–9 (representation of indigents);
DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 916–21, 928–37 (excerpted articles dealing with indigent
defense); MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 730–57 (broad analysis of indigent defense systems);
WEAVER ET AL., supra note 13, at 51–52 (indigent defense).
51
See supra note 17.
52
COHEN & HALL, supra note 13; LOEWY, supra note 13; MOSKOVITZ, supra note 13; TASLITZ
& PARIS, supra note 13; JOHNSON & CLOUD, supra note 13; WEINREB, supra note 13.
53
See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 13, at 24–25 (indicating that four out of five defendants in
the nation’s largest seventy-five counties were represented by appointed counsel). Many texts devote
a single page or note to describe the under-resourced defender’s office, see, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra
note 13, at 163–65, and focus instead on ineffective assistance. Occasionally, when describing the
post-arrest process, a text introduces students to the criminal justice system through the well-to-do
defendant who calls a private lawyer rather than through the MORE common experience of the poor
person who, if lucky, will find a public defender, a stranger, present at the initial appearance.
WEAVER ET AL., supra note 13, at 727. (“Invariably the first communication that defense counsel
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would respond if asked to evaluate another country’s justice system that denied
counsel to an accused at the outset of a prosecution.
Third and most important, not a single text informs students of the hard truth:
most poor people have no lawyer when first appearing in court or at bail
proceedings. Few students are informed it is the rare state and locality where
counsel is actually present; nor are they told that many detainees, who are
disproportionately people of color, remain incarcerated for lengthy periods before
seeing their counsel. In contrast, some texts portray the pretrial process in such a
way that the reader could infer that accused indigents are represented at the initial
stage.54
On the brighter side, several authors do an exceptionally good job explaining
the Supreme Court’s constitutional critical stage analysis and suggesting that bail
ought to be considered such a proceeding where states must provide counsel.55
They make a compelling argument for indigent defendants’ right to counsel at bail
and provide the more adventurous and curious student a basis for examining the
issue further. More common, however, are authors who devote a small section of
their casebook to explain the critical stage analysis and who make no effort to
apply the analysis to bail.56
VI. CONCLUSION
I applaud law professors who present rulings like Powell and Gideon and
Argersinger as a centerpiece of their criminal procedure course. Doing so provides
receives about a case is a telephone call from a defendant or the defendant’s friends or relatives
stating that the defendant has been arrested and wants to be immediately released on bail.”).
54
Sometimes authors provide an overview of the criminal process and indicate that
defendants are brought before a court and informed about the right to counsel without clearly stating
that they must self-represent at this stage. COOK & MARCUS, supra note 16, at 4; KAMISAR ET AL.,
supra note 16, at 13 (“at least where defendant is not accompanied by counsel, the magistrate will
inform of the right to be represented by counsel and if indigent, the right to court-appointed
counsel”). Authors also may inadvertently give the impression that counsel is present at bail hearings
nationally. See, e.g., DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 13, at 903–05 (authors mention large cities’
arraignment courts that operate 24/7 and then include a New York City attorney’s description of his
representation of indigent defendants at bail); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 56 (describing an
indigent defendant’s frustration in not gaining an attorney of choice may suggest he already had an
attorney); TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 13, at 50 (explaining the criminal process where a defendant
is arrested and appears at arraignment where “he will enjoy certain important rights, such as the right
to counsel. If the defendant is indigent, a public defender or private appointed counsel may be
assigned to represent him.” This may suggest legal representation is immediately available at the bail
hearing.).
55
See supra note 16.
56
Others are very skimpy. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 13, at 95–96; TASLITZ & PARIS,
supra note 13, at 805 nn.1–2); WEAVER ET AL., supra note 13, at 539–52 (lineups only; devotes one
note to discussion); MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 13 (short note on page 693–94 dealing with
interrogation); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 167–68; SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 13, at 852–
54; LOEWY, supra note 13, at 613–61 (statements only).
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context for understanding that it was not so long ago when poor people were left to
defend themselves at felony and misdemeanor trials. Updating the current denial
of counsel reality is important in order to overcome the danger that students and
soon-to-be lawyers will take these showcase rulings as evidence that our legal
system has fulfilled its “noble ideal” of providing counsel to the poor at the earliest
stage of a criminal proceeding.
Today’s defendants face a Gideon-like situation when they first appear in
state court before a judicial officer: they must defend their liberty without a lawyer
to argue for pretrial release and to advise against making an inculpatory statement
that is admissible at trial. Thereafter during the pretrial stage, indigent defendants
may remain without a lawyer for lengthy periods before meeting their assigned
defender.
Because law professors’ primary mission is to educate and prepare students
for the practice of law, we must ask hard questions when reflecting on what we are
teaching students about the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Do our teaching
responsibilities require that we identify and highlight the absence of counsel when
an accused first appears in court? Should we motivate and encourage students to
address the lack of representation at this crucial stage during their professional
lives as part of their ethical responsibility to enhance the administration of justice?
Had we been teaching in the pre-Gideon days, the answer would be easy. Most
members of the academy would have focused students’ attention to the abysmal
situation of an accused’s self-representation at trial.
Today’s defenseless defendant population deserves the same academic
involvement and scrutiny of states’ pretrial systems that expect poor people to selfrepresent at bail. Criminal procedure authors and professors should require
students to take a first-hand look at the existing courtroom practice in their locality
and to report on Gideon’s reality. Better yet, professors should accompany their
students to court and then facilitate discussion of Gideon’s and Argersinger’s
theoretical ideal during the classes that follow.
We have reached the point when “the dynamics of the profession” make it
essential for the academy to sound the Gideon II alarm. Law professors, especially
those who author textbooks, have a special responsibility. We must inform
students of a right to counsel crisis that only they, as future lawyers, are likely to
solve.

